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National Missile Defense - Political Analysis Missile defense remains a contentious issue, with advocates and detractors so passionate in their convictions that NMD sometimes resembles a theological, rather than a public policy, issue. - "National Missile Defense: Examining the Options" The Argument for NMD Fiscal Concerns Domestic Political Pressures International Reactions to NMD NMD, Russia, and the ABM Treaty Ethical Implications The Argument for NMD Over the course of the Cold War, the US learned to live with the Damocle's Sword of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). MAD recognized that both the Soviet Union and the US had enough nuclear weapons to destroy the other many times over, and that any first strike by one side that did not destroy the nuclear capabilities of the other would mean complete destruction for both countries. The US and the USSR both developed safeguards to ensure that their second-strike systems could never be destroyed. The reasoning was that if both sides knew that they could never initiate a nuclear war without being destroyed, neither country would be willing to start one. Deterrence--the theory that nations will be prevented from taking certain actions when faced with the threat of retaliation--assumes the adversary is rational. - "Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Does the Clinton Administration Understand the Threat?" MAD certainly posed risks. Both sides needed to project a willingness to use their nuclear weapons to maintain the credibility of their second-strike deterrent, and this put the weapons on a hair-trigger. Mistakes did happen, and in some cases they almost led to nuclear holocaust. On the whole, however, it was a stable system. The two superpowers at least trusted that the other was rational enough not to begin a nuclear attack except in the most dire circumstances. The end of the Cold War improved, but did not end all threats to, US security. The US, Europe, Russia, and China continue to export armarments and military technology across the globe. In conjunction with the diffusion of scientific know-how and the end of the limits that the structured bi-polar world of the Cold War provided, many nations are developing advanced militaries. Today's threat is not a superpower but small, "rogue nations." These nations - commonly identified as Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya - might not respect the overwhelming nuclear and conventional superiority of the US Secretary of Defense William Perry said that "The threat of retaliation may not matter much to a terrorist group or a rogue nation -- deterrence may not work with them. This new class of 'undeterrables' may be madder than MAD" (1), and his sentiments were echoed by the Heritage Foundation's James H. Anderson, who said that "[t]he Soviet commissars, constrained by the chess-game of superpower politics, were models of restraint compared to the missile-armed leaders we will probably face in the future" (2). One of the reasons ballistic missiles are so attractive to so many countries is that there are currently no defenses against them....History teaches us that weakness is provocative and, in a real sense, the absence of missile defense provokes others into seeking such weapons. - Dr. Henry Kissinger Only North Korea has the capability to strike the US with a missile, and even it can only hit the periphery of Alaska (3), but nonetheless the fear remains that these nations and others have clandestine programs that may give them the capability to strike the US with little warning in the near future. Back to Table of Contents Fiscal Concerns NMD is not cheap. The US has spent more than $67.7 billion on missile defense since 1983 (4), and the Congressional Budget Office said that the proposed NMD system would cost $50 to $60 billion over the next 15 years (5). To put this in perspective, the total sum proposed in the year 2001 budget for National Defense is $292.2 billion (6). The conflict over cost is clearly divided between those who believe in the technology and who view the threat from rogue nations as pressing and those who believe the technology is flawed and the threat minimal. Some in the army oppose NMD because they believe the money could be better spent on proven weaponry. General Michael Ryan, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, said that "I would support building [NMD] if the threat warranted it, and not just if it is feasible. It has to be practical too. 'Feasible' means that you would put a heck of a lot of money against something just to get it up there. 'Practical' means that we could get it up without breaking the bank" (7). If the current CBO estimates are correct, the annual outlay for this ... national missile defense system would be less than 1% of then-year budgets. At that rate, a missile defense capable of sparing even a single American city from attack by missile-delivered weapons of mass destruction, to say nothing of perhaps all of them, would be cheap at twice the CBO's price. - "Missile Defense: Cheap At Twice the Price" Some simply oppose the NMD because they believe the money could be better spent on non-military programs, such as education or health-care. On the other hand, to those who believe that the threat from rogue nations is real, the cost is negligible compared to the potential benefits. Defenders of the system point out that the total military budget for the next 15 years is projected to be $4.5 trillion - surely some money can be found in that for the $60 billion that defending the country against nuclear attacks will cost (8). Back to Table of Contents Domestic Political Pressures According to Republican National Committee Chairman Jim Nicholson, not having the ability to defend against a missile attack could become the "most important [security] issue of the 2000 election . . . I don't think people in the country fully realize the enormity of the threat we're facing." - "National Missile Defense: Examining the Options" The domestic pressure on President Clinton in the upcoming decision on deployment of NMD is enormous. The Heritage Foundation says that if NMD is deployed, the US government will finally be fulfilling "its number one moral and constitutional obligation: 'to provide for the common defense'" (9). Any politician worth his salt can draw up images of American lives being annihilated by North Korean missiles. The fear that politicians have of being attacked on this ground led to a 345-71 vote in the House and a 97-3 vote in the Senate in support of a resolution that the US deploy NMD as soon as is technologically feasible. Many analysts believe that Clinton may decide to deploy to defend himself, the Democrats, and Al Gore from Republican attacks, regardless of the real costs and benefits of the system (10). Back to Table of Contents International Reactions to NMD The US, as the world's most powerful state, is frequently subject to international scrutiny that other countries are not. This extends particularly to military decisions, given the huge American military advantage over the rest of the world. NMD has faced criticism from Europe (11), who fear that the system will break the common US/Europe defense system that has been in place for the past fifty years if the US commits to only a National, and not an International, Missile Defense (12). There are also questions about American motivation for NMD. Many nations believe that the US has nothing to fear from rogue states, who would surely not provoke a US nuclear response by attacking the US first. The only situation in which a rogue state would attack the US would be one in which the rogue state was backed it into a corner by America, in which case the NMD is not so much a defense as a shield for US military actions against other nations. NMD would therefore only encourage US militarism and interfering with other nations. A Rand corporation report put this affect of NMD in a positive light - "ballistic missile defense is not simply a shield but an enabler of US action. Although the United States presumably would not be deterred by a rogue's missile threat from intervening abroad to protect literally vital US interests, the inability to act in defense of less-than-vital interests [in the absence of NMD] would severely undermine the US international role and the peace and security that depend on that role" (13), but clearly not everyone views it so positively. Back to Table of Contents NMD, Russia, and the ABM Treaty The United States Government would forsake deep reductions in the Russian and American arsenals in favor of deploying a limited missile defense against a threat that doesn't yet exist. - Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Russia and the United States today have a positive relationship and have defused much of the nuclear tension from the Cold War, but massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons remain. The START I treaty of 1991 limited both sides to 6,000 nuclear warheads each, and the START II treaty, ratified by the US Senate in 1996 and by the Russian Duma last month, limits both sides to 3,500 warheads (14). One of the attacks commonly used against NMD is that it will prevent the further progress of disarmarment. In the Rejkavik summit of 1986, Mikhael Gorbachev proposed a 50% bilateral cut in nuclear forces by the US and the USSR, pursuant upon the US abandoning SDI. Ronald Reagan refused, and the 50% cut would only happen 5 years later (15). The situation is even more touchy for the US and Russia today with NMD. Russia declared itself the successor to the USSR in all treaties, and so it claims that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 that the USSR signed with the US is still in effect. This treaty prevents either signatory from deploying a NMD system. Proponents of NMD argue that while the US has observed the treaty since the fall of the Soviet Union, because the Senate has not approved the succession agreement signed with Russia, the treaty is no longer legally binding (16). Others argue that only the President can nullify a treaty, and that since both Presidents Bush and Clinton have declared it to still be in effect, it is (17). In keeping with this line of thought, the US has recently submitted a request to Russia to renegotiate the treaty. Russia, however, insists the treaty will stand as is. [The ABM Treaty] has become so central to Russia's military strategy and national security that the Russians regard it as sacrosanct. Thus Moscow sees U.S. attempts to change the treaty as a threat to Russia's already precarious geopolitical stability. - Rachel Dubin, "National Missile Defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: Risks and Strategies" Russia is opposed to US NMD because Russia's status as a great power at the moment is based on nothing more than Russia's huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons (18). While NMD would certainly not pose any threat to Russia's second-strike capabilities, Russia feels that an America NMD would be daring it into a new arms race that it cannot possibly afford. It is widely feared that to protest any US deployment of NMD, Russia will respond with its only remaining card - refusing to negotiate new nuclear arms reduction treaties. It's nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability. - Dr. Henry Kissinger Even if the ABM Treaty is still in effect, and even if Russia will refuse to continue disarmament talks, many still believe the US should deploy NMD. Protecting American citizens from nuclear weapons is too important to let a treaty or Russian pride stop us (19). Adhering to the ABM treaty was important when it served to protect American interests - but not when it stops the US from protecting American lives. Disarmament is good, but some would claim that we are confusing the methods of convincing Russia to disarm with the benefit of disarmament. Letting ourselves be helpless is not good in and of itself, and if defense is a greater benefit than continued disarmament there is no reason to remain defenseless. Back to Table of Contents Ethical Implications There are four main ethical questions that surround the decision to deploy NMD:
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