# CS 43: Computer Networks

18: Network Layer, IP November 14, 2024



# The Network Layer!

Application: the application (e.g., the Web, Email)

Transport: end-to-end connections, reliability

**Network: routing** 

Link (data-link): framing, error detection

Physical: 1's and 0's/bits across a medium (copper, the air, fiber)

## Network Layer Functions

- Forwarding: move packets from router's input to appropriate router output
  - Look up in a table
- Routing: determine route taken by packets from source to destination.
  - Populating the table

#### IP Datagrams

how much overhead?

- 20 bytes of TCP
- 20 bytes of IP
- = 40 bytes + app layer overhead

| С | ) 2  | 1    | 8 | 12      | 1 | .6              | 19 | 24 | 32 |
|---|--|------|---|---------|---|-----------------|----|----|----|
|   | Version  | HLen | D | SCP/ECN |   | Datagram Length |    |    |    |
|   | Identifier                                     |      |   | Flags   |   | Offset          |    |    |    |
|   | TTL Protocol                                   |      |   |         |   | Checksum        |    |    |    |
|   | Source IP Address                              |      |   |         |   |                 |    |    |    |
|   | Destination IP Address                         |      |   |         |   |                 |    |    |    |
|   | Options (if any, usually not)                  |      |   |         |   |                 |    |    |    |
|   | Data (variable len: typically TCP/UDP segment) |      |   |         |   |                 |    |    |    |

#### IP Datagrams



### What's in a name?

- Host name: web.cs.swarthmore.edu
  - Domain: registrar for each top-level domain (e.g., .edu)
  - Host name: local administrator assigns to each host
- IP addresses: 130.58.68.164
  - Prefixes: ICANN, regional Internet registries, and ISPs
  - Hosts: static configuration, or dynamic using DHCP
- MAC addresses: D8:D3:85:94:5F:1E
  - OIDs: assigned to vendors by the IEEE
  - Adapters: assigned by the vendor from its block

# IP Addressing

- IP: 32-bit addresses
  - Usually written in dotted notation, e.g. 192.168.21.76
  - Each number is a byte
  - Stored in Big Endian order (network byte order)



#### **IP** Prefixes

Slide 8

• Written in IP address/length notation

1000000 00001101

- Address is the lowest address in the allocated block. Length is prefix in bits.
- E.g. 128.13.0.0/16 is 128.13.0.0 to 128.13.255.255
  Read as: "128.13.0.0 slash 16" prefix.



XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXX

#### Subnets

- IP address:
  - subnet part high order bits
  - host part low order bits
- what's a subnet?
  - device interfaces with same subnet part of IP address
  - can physically reach each other without intervening router
  - •On the same link layer



# Who gets an address? How many?

- Classful Addressing
  - Class A: 8-bit prefix, 24 bits for hosts (16,777,216)
  - Class B: 16-bit prefix, 16 bits for hosts (65,536)
  - Class C: 24-bit prefix, 8 bits for hosts (256)

| 00001100 | 00100010 | 10011110 | 0000101 |  |  |  |  |  |
|----------|----------|----------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Class A  |          |          |         |  |  |  |  |  |
| Class B  |          |          |         |  |  |  |  |  |
| Class C  |          |          |         |  |  |  |  |  |

Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)

#### IP Address : 12.4.0.0 IP Mask: 255.254.0.0



Written as 12.4.0.0/15

Use two 32-bit numbers to represent a network. Network number = IP address + Mask

Slide 11

# Datagram forwarding table



Routers exchange state (we'll save the what and when for later). They decide, for each destination, how to get there, and build a lookup structure for their forwarding table. What should they build?

- A. A list scan for the destination.
- B. A hash table look up the destination.
- C. A tree Follow branches that lead to the destination.
- D. Some other software structure.
- E. We can't do this in software, we need special hardware.

# Look-up Algorithm

- Protocol: ATM (Virtual Circuits), Ethernet (Flat addresses)
  - Mechanism: Exact Match
  - Techniques: Direct lookup, Hash Tables, Binary Trees
- Protocol: IPv4, IPv6
  - Mechanism: Longest Prefix Match
  - Techniques: Prefix Trees, TCAM (Ternary Content Addressable Memories)

# Datagram forwarding table

| Destination A         | Link Interface |                  |                 |   |
|-----------------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|---|
| 11001000 0<br>through | 0010111        | 00010000         | 0000000         | 0 |
| 11001000 0            | 0010111        | 0001 <u>0111</u> | <u>11111111</u> | 0 |
| 11001000 0            | 0010111        | 00011000         | <u>0000000</u>  |   |
| through<br>11001000 0 | 0010111        | 00011000         | <u>11111111</u> | 1 |
| 11001000 0            | 0010111        | 00011 <u>001</u> | <u>0000000</u>  |   |
| through<br>11001000 0 | 0010111        | 00011 <u>111</u> | <u>11111111</u> | 2 |
| Otherwise (de         | 3              |                  |                 |   |

# Longest prefix matching

In a forwarding table entry, use the longest address prefix that matches destination address.

| Destination IP Address Range                             | Link interface |
|--|----------------|
| upper 16 bit> 00010*** *******                           | 0              |
| <b>upper 16 bit&gt; 0001</b> 1000 *******                | 1              |
| <pre><upper 16="" bit=""> 00011*** *******</upper></pre> | 2              |
| Otherwise (default gateway)                              | 3              |

DA: <upper 16 bits> 00011000 10101010

DA: <upper 16 bits> 00010110 10100001

which interface?

#### Router architecture overview

• high-level view of generic router architecture:





# Longest prefix matching

In a forwarding table entry, use the longest address prefix that matches destination address.

| Destination IP Address Range                              | Link interface |
|---|----------------|
| <pre><upper 16="" bit=""> 00010*** *******</upper></pre>  | 0              |
| <pre><upper 16="" bit=""> 00011000 ********</upper></pre> | 1              |
| <pre><upper 16="" bit=""> 00011*** ********</upper></pre> | 2              |
| Otherwise (default gateway)                               | 3              |

# **Binary Prefix Tree**

- Store the prefixes as a tree
  - Prefixes "spelled out" following a path from the root
  - One bit for each level of the tree
  - Some nodes correspond to valid prefixes
  - ... which have next-hop interfaces in a table
- When a packet arrives
  - Traverse the tree based on the destination address
  - Stop upon reaching the longest matching prefix



| Prefix Range-1 | 0*  | 1 |
|----------------|-----|---|
| Prefix Range-2 | 00* | 2 |
| Prefix Range-3 | 11* | 3 |

Depth = W Degree = 2 Stride = 1 bit

## Multi-bit Prefix Tree

- Store the prefixes as a tree: 4-ary tree
  - k bits for each level of the tree



| Prefix Range-1 | 111*   | 1 |
|----------------|--------|---|
| Prefix Range-2 | 10*    | 2 |
| Prefix Range-3 | 1010*  | 3 |
| Prefix Range-4 | 10101* | 4 |

Depth = W/k Degree = 2^k Stride = k bits

# Even Faster Lookups

- Can use special hardware
  - Content Addressable Memories (CAMs)
  - Allows look-ups on a key rather than flat address
- Huge innovations in the mid-to-late 1990s
  - After CIDR was introduced (in 1994)
  - ... and longest-prefix match was a major bottleneck

#### Hierarchical Addressing: Route Aggregation

Hierarchical addressing allows efficient advertisement of routing information:



#### Hierarchical Addressing: Route Aggregation

"Send me anything with addresses beginning 200.23.16.0/20" translates to the following:



/20 prefix contains the range of IP addresses that match the the first 20 bits, and can have any value for the remaining 12 bits in the range of : [first 20 bits] 0000 00000000 [first 20 bits] 1111 1111111 A total of 2^12 = 4,096 IP addresses

#### Route aggregation in Fly-By-Night ISP

Fly-By-Night-ISP

```
200.23.16.0/20 = 11001000 00010111 00010000 0000000
```

Individual Organizations: All of these organizations IP addresses lie withinFly-by-Night's /20 prefix (first 20 bits are the same)

- they more <u>specifically match on the three more bits to form a /23 prefix (first 23 bits</u> of all IP addresses within their organization are the same).
- The last 9 (32-23) bits provide 2^9 = 512 unique IP addresses within each organization.
  /23 prefixes

200.23.16.0/23 = 11001000 00010111 00010000 00000000

200.23.18.0/23 = 11001000 00010111 00010010 00000000

200.23.20.0/23 = 11001000 00010111 00010100 00000000

200.23.30.0/23 = 11001000 00010111 00011110 00000000

#### What should we do if organization 1 decides to switch to ISPs-R-Us?





- A. Move 200.23.18.0/23 to ISPs-R-Us (and break up Fly-By-Night's /20 block).
- B. Give new addresses to Organization 1 (and force them to change all their addresses).
- C. Some other solution.

#### Hierarchical addressing: More Specific Routes

ISPs-R-Us has a more specific route to Organization I



#### Hierarchical addressing: More Specific Routes

ISPs-R-Us has a more specific route to Organization I



#### Longest Prefix Matching at Router 1

| output link   |  |
|---|--|
| (to Fly-by-Night ISP)<br>(to ISPs-R-Us)<br>(to ISPs-R-Us) |  |
|   | output link<br>(to Fly-by-Night ISP)<br>(to ISPs-R-Us)<br>(to ISPs-R-Us) |

Now, when an incoming packet addressed with destination address 200.23.18.5 arrives – this address belongs to Organization 1 and the packet will be matched using longest prefix matching and will be routed to ISPs-R-Us rather than the Fly-by-Night ISP. Router 1

## IP Datagrams

- IP Datagrams are like a letter
  - Totally self-contained
  - Include all necessary addressing information
  - No advanced setup of connections or circuits

| 0   | 4  | 8 | 12       | 1     | 6 1 | 19            | 24            | 31 |  |
|-----|--|---|----------|-------|-----|---------------|---------------|----|--|
| Ver | sion HLe                                       | n | DSCP/ECN |       |     | Da            | tagram Length |    |  |
|     | Identifier                                     |   |          | Flags |     | Offset        |               |    |  |
|     | TTL Protocol                                   |   |          |       | He  | ader Checksun | า             |    |  |
|     | Source IP Address                              |   |          |       |     |               |               |    |  |
|     | Destination IP Address                         |   |          |       |     |               |               |    |  |
|     | Options (if any, usually not)                  |   |          |       |     |               |               |    |  |
|     | Data (variable len: typically TCP/UDP segment) |   |          |       |     |               |               |    |  |

## How does an end host get an IP address?

- Static IP: hard-coded
  - Windows: control-panel->network->configuration >tcp/ip->properties
  - UNIX: /etc/rc.config
- DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol: dynamically get address from as server
  - "plug-and-play"

## DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

Goal: allow host to dynamically obtain its IP address from network server when it joins network

- can renew its lease on address in use
- allows reuse of addresses
- support for mobile users who want to join network

#### DHCP overview:

- host broadcasts "DHCP discover" msg [optional]
- DHCP server responds with "DHCP offer" msg [optional]
- host requests IP address: "DHCP request" msg
- DHCP server sends address: "DHCP ack" msg

#### DHCP client-server scenario



#### DHCP: More than IP Addresses

DHCP can return more than just allocated IP address on subnet:

- address of first-hop router for client (default GW)
- name and IP address of DNS server(s)
- subnet mask

#### IP Fragmentation, Reassembly

- Higher layer's data unit is too large for the lower layer
- Fragmentation: taking a large data unit and breaking it into smaller chunks
- Assembly: combining chunks into the original data unit.

Examples:

- Transport: TCP takes stream of bytes and breaks into TCP segments
- Network: IP takes packets too big for a link and breaks them up into IP fragments
- Link: 6lowpan takes IPv6 packets and breaks them into link fragments if needed.
### IP Fragmentation, Reassembly

Different link layers have different MTUs (max transfer size) - largest possible link-level frame

large IP datagram divided ("fragmented") into several datagrams



### IP Datagram Format



### IP Fragmentation, Reassembly

- Different link layers have different MTUs (max transfer size) largest possible link-level frame
- large IP datagram divided ("fragmented") into several datagrams
  - Reassembled only at final destination
  - IP header bits used to identify, order related fragments



### IP Fragmentation, Reassembly

### Before fragmentation



- IP addresses plus ident field identify fragments of a packet
- MF bit is 1 in all but last fragment
- Offset field says location of fragment (in 8 byte chunks)
  - All fragments except last one must be multiple of 8 bytes long



### IP Path MTU Discovery

- Avoid fragmentation: Host tests link with a large packet
- Implemented with ICMP: set DF do not fragment. Triggers error response from a router



### How can we use this for evil?

- A. Send fragments that overlap.
- B. Send many tiny fragments, none of which have offset 0.
- C. Send fragments that, when assembled, are bigger than the maximum IP datagram.
- D. More than one of the above.
- E. Nah, networks (and operating systems) are too robust for this to cause problems.

## IP Fragmentation Attacks...

### IP fragmentation exploits [edit]

### IP fragment overlapped [edit]

The IP fragment overlapped exploit occurs when two fragments contained within the same IP datagram have offsets that indicate that they overlap each other in positioning within the datagram. This could mean that either fragment A is being completely overwritten by fragment B, or that fragment A is partially being overwritten by fragment B. Some operating systems do not properly handle fragments that overlap in this manner and may throw exceptions or behave in other undesirable ways upon receipt of overlapping fragments. This is the basis for the teardrop Denial of service attacks.

### IP fragmentation buffer full [edit]

The IP fragmentation buffer full exploit occurs when there is an excessive amount of incomplete fragmented traffic detected on the protected network. This could be due to an excessive number of incomplete fragmented datagrams, a large number of fragments for individual datagrams or a combination of quantity of incomplete datagrams and size/number of fragments in each datagram. This type of traffic is most likely an attempt to bypass security measures or Intrusion Detection Systems by intentional fragmentation of attack activity.

### IP fragment overrun [edit]

The IP Fragment Overrun exploit is when a reassembled fragmented datagram exceeds the declared IP data length or the maximum datagram length. By definition, no IP datagram should be larger than 65,535 bytes. Systems that try to process these large datagrams can crash, and can be indicative of a denial of service attempt.

### IP fragment overwrite [edit]

Overlapping fragments may be used in an attempt to bypass Intrusion Detection Systems. In this exploit, part of an attack is sent in fragments along with additional random data; future fragments may overwrite the random data with the remainder of the attack. If the completed datagram is not properly reassembled at the IDS, the attack will go undetected.

### IP fragment too many datagrams [edit]

The Too Many Datagrams exploit is identified by an excessive number of incomplete fragmented datagrams detected on the network. This is usually either a denial of service attack or an attempt to bypass security measures. An example of "Too Many Datagrams", "Incomplete Datagram" and "Fragment Too Small" is the Rose Attack.<sup>[1]</sup>

### IP fragment incomplete datagram [edit]

This exploit occurs when a datagram can not be fully reassembled due to missing data. This can indicate a denial of service attack or an attempt to defeat packet filter security policies.

### IP fragment too small [edit]

An IP Fragment Too Small exploit is when any fragment other than the final fragment is less than 400 bytes, indicating that the fragment is likely intentionally crafted. Small fragments may be used in denial of service attacks or in an attempt to bypass security measures or detection.

### Recall: IPv4 Addresses

- 32-bit number, must be globally unique
- 2<sup>32</sup> => 4,294,967,296 possible addresses
- How many do <u>you</u> have?

CORE NETWORKING AND SECURITY

About | Scott Hogg is the CTO for Global Technology Resources, Inc. (GTRI). Scott provides network engineering, security consulting, and training services to his clients.

### **ARIN Finally Runs Out of IPv4 Addresses**



An insider's guide to the private IPv4 market

RELATED

Techniques for Prolonging the Lifespan of IPv4



on IDG Answers → If I buy a Chromebook and can't get to grips with OS can I convert to windows?

IPv4 Address Cupboards are Bare in North America.

Network World | Sep 22, 2015 7:25 AM PT

RELATED TOPICS



6 COMMENTS It is often said, "the Internet is running out of phone numbers," as a way to express that the Internet is running out of IPv4 addresses, to those who are unfamiliar with Internet technologies. IPv4 addresses, like phone numbers are assigned hierarchically, and thus, have inherent inefficiency. The world's Internet population has been growing and the <u>number of Internet-connected devices continues to rise</u>, with no end in sight. In the next week, the <u>American Registry for Internet Numbers</u> (ARIN) will have exhausted their supply of IPv4 addresses. The metaphorical IPv4 cupboards are bare. This long-predicted Internet historical event marks opening a new chapter of the Internet's evolution. However, it is somehow anti-climactic now that this date has arrived. The Internet will continue to operate, but all organizations must now accelerate their efforts to deploy IPv6.



Network jobs

in 2016

Wireless network

are hot: salaries

expected to rise

### **ARIN IPv4 Address Exhaustion**

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) delegates authority for Internet resources to the five RIRs that cover the world. The <u>American Registry for Internet</u> <u>Numbers</u> (ARIN) is the <u>Regional Internet Registry</u> (RIR) for the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, and North Atlantic islands. ARIN has been managing the assignment of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and Autonomous System (AS) numbers for several decades. Each RIR has been managing their limited IPv4 address stores and going through their <u>various</u> <u>phases of exhaustion policies</u>. ARIN has been in <u>Phase 4</u> of their IPv4 depletion plan for more than a year now. ARIN will soon announce that they have completely extinguished their supply of IPv4 addresses.

### Seriously, we're done now. We're done

Exhausted with never-ending internet exhaustion

By Kieren McCarthy in San Francisco 15 Feb 2017 at 23:07 214 💭 SHARE ▼



You may have heard this before, but we are really, really running out of public IPv4 addresses.

This week, the regional internet registry responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean, LACNIC, announced it has moved to "phase 3" of its plan to dispense with the remaining network addresses, meaning that only companies that have not received any IPv4 space are eligible. There is no phase 4.

That means LACNIC is down to its last 4,698,112 public IPv4 addresses (although that may increase as it recovers a little bit of space over time).

Slide 46

Data Centre - Networks

## OK, this time it's for real: The last available IPv4 address block has gone

Now for the last time, will you all please shift to IPv6?!

By Kieren McCarthy in San Francisco 18 Apr 2018 at 22:10 211 📮 SHARE 🔻



You may have heard this one before, but we have now really run out of public IPv4 address blocks.

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority – the global overseers of network addresses – said it had run out of new addresses to dish out to regional internet registries (RIRs) in 2011. One of those RIRs, the Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre, said it was out of available IPv4 addresses later that year.

Then Europe's RIR, Réseaux IP Européens aka RIPE, ran dry in September 2012, followed by the Latin America and Caribbean Network Information Centre (LACNIC) in June 2014. Next, the American Registry for Internet Numbers hit an IPv4 drought in September 2015.

Slide 47

### Private Addresses

- Defined in RFC 1918:
  - 10.0.0/8 (16,777,216 hosts)
  - 172.16.0.0/12 (1,048,576 hosts)
  - 192.168.0.0/16 (65536 hosts)
- These addresses shouldn't be routed.
  - Anyone can use them.
  - Often adopted for use with NAT.

### NAT: Network Address Translation



all datagrams leaving local network have same single source NAT IP address: 138.76.29.7,different source port numbers datagrams with source or destination in this network have 10.0.0/24 address for source, destination

## Implementing NAT

- Two hosts communicate with same destination
  - Destination needs to differentiate the two
- Map outgoing packets
  - Change source address and source port
- Maintain a translation table
  - Map of (src addr, port #) to (NAT addr, new port #)
- Map incoming packets
  - Map the destination address/port to the local host

## NAT: network address translation



## NAT: network address translation

NAT translation table WAN side addr LAN side addr

NAT Address, 7000 Local address, 3000

# Neither the sender nor receiver need to know that NAT is happening... 10.0.0.2

// D:138.76.29.7,5001

4: NAT router changes datagram dest addr from NAT Address, 7000 to Local Address, 3000

### NAT Advantages

- Organizations need fewer IP addresses from their ISP.
  - With a 16-bit port field, we can put 65535 connections behind one external IP address!
- Organizations can change internal network IPs without having to change outside world IPs.

## Principled Objections Against NAT

- Routers are not supposed to look at port #s
  - Network layer should care only about *IP* header
  - and not be looking at the *port numbers* at all
- NAT violates the end-to-end argument
  - Network nodes should not modify the packets
- IPv6 is a cleaner solution
  - Better to migrate than to limp along with a hack

# That's what happens when network puts power in hands of end users!

When we use NATs, devices inside the local network are not explicitly addressable or visible to the outside world.

A. This is an advantage.

B. This is a disadvantage.

## How do we feel about NAT?

- A. NAT is great! It conserves IP addresses and makes it harder to reach non-public machines.
- B. NAT is mostly good, but has a few negative features. No big deal.
- C. NAT is mostly bad, but in some cases, it's a necessary evil.
- D. NAT is an abomination that violates the end to end principle, and we should not use it!

### IPv6

- Initial motivation: 32-bit address space soon to be completely allocated, any day now<sup>™</sup>.
- Additional motivation:
  - header format helps speed processing/forwarding
  - header changes to facilitate QoS

### IPv6 datagram format:

- fixed-length 40 byte header
- no fragmentation allowed



## Other changes from IPv4

- checksum: removed entirely to reduce processing time at each hop
- options: allowed, but outside of header, indicated by "Next Header" field
- ICMPv6: new version of ICMP
  - additional message types, e.g. "Packet Too Big"
  - multicast group management functions

### IPv6 (vs. IPv4)

• Simpler, faster, better

- How much traffic on the Internet is IPv6?
- Why?!

# IPv6 celebrates its 20th birthday by reaching 10 percent deployment

All I want for my birthday is a new IP header.

ILJITSCH VAN BEIJNUM - 1/3/2016, 12:00 PM

Twenty years ago this month, RFC 1883 was published: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification. So what's an Internet Protocol, and what's wrong with the previous five versions? And if version 6 is so great, why has it only been adopted by half a percent of the Internet's users each year over the past two decades?

### 10 percent!

First the good news. According to Google's statistics, on December 26, the world reached 9.98 percent IPv6 deployment, up from just under 6 percent a year earlier. Google measures IPv6 deployment by having a small fraction of their users execute a Javascript program that tests whether the computer in question can load URLs over IPv6. During weekends, a tenth of Google's users are able to do this, but during weekdays it's less than 8 percent. Apparently more people have IPv6 available at home than at work.

## Transitioning to IPv6

- Option 1: "Flag day"
  - How do we get *everyone* on the Internet to agree?
  - Whose authority to decide when?
  - Can you imagine how much would break?
- Option 2: Slow transition
  - Some hosts/routers speak both versions
  - Must have some way to deal with those who don't
  - Lack of incentive to switch

# Tunneling

 IPv6 datagram carried as *payload* in IPv4 datagram among IPv4 routers



## Tunneling



Slide 63

- Service Model
  - Reporting message: self-contained message reporting error
  - Unreliable: Simple datagram service no retries.

- Used to communicate network information
  - "Control messages", i.e., not data themselves
  - Error reporting
    - Unreachable host
    - Unreachable network
    - Unreachable port
    - TTL expired
  - Test connectivity
    - Echo request/response (ping)

- Header:
  - 1-byte type
  - 1-byte code
  - 2-byte checksum
  - 4 bytes vary by type

- Sits above IP
  - Type 1 in IP header
  - Usually considered part of IP

Portion of offending packet, starting with its IP header



| <u>Type</u> | <u>Code</u> | <u>Description</u>        | Тур |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|-----|
| 0           | 0           | echo reply (ping)         | 4   |
| 3           | 0           | dest. network unreachable |     |
| 3           | 1           | dest host unreachable     | 8   |
| 3           | 2           | dest protocol unreachable | 9   |
| 3           | 3           | dest port unreachable     | 10  |
| 3           | 6           | dest network unknown      | 11  |
| 3           | 7           | dest host unknown         | 12  |

| <u>Type</u> | <u>Code</u> | Description               |
|-------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 4           | 0           | source quench (congestion |
|             |             | control - not used)       |
| 8           | 0           | echo request (ping)       |
| 9           | 0           | route advertisement       |
| 10          | 0           | router discovery          |
| 11          | 0           | TTL expired               |

12 0 bad IP header





# Ping



### Traceroute and ICMP

- Source sends sets of UDP segments (usually 3) to dest
  - first set has TTL =1
  - second set has TTL=2, etc.
  - unlikely port number
- When *n*th set of datagrams arrives to nth router:
  - router discards datagrams
  - and sends source ICMP messages (type 11, code 0)
  - ICMP messages includes name of router & IP address
- When ICMP messages arrives, source records RTTs



### Traceroute and ICMP

### stopping criteria:

- UDP segment eventually arrives at destination host
- destination returns ICMP "port unreachable" message (type 3, code 3)
- source stops



### Traceroute Demo

Te = Time exceeded Pu = Port unreachable



Slide 71

| 5   | Episode.IV (206.214.251.1) 68.642 ms 67.307 ms 67.005 ms                     |
|-----|--|
|     | A.NEW.HOPE (206.214.251.6) 65.986 ms 68.502 ms 68.708 ms                     |
| 8   | It.is.a.period.of.civil.war (206.214.251.9) 67.067 ms 70.139 ms 66.52        |
|     | Rebel.spaceships (206.214.251.14) 70.214 ms 70.192 ms 71.622 ms              |
| 10  | striking.from.a.hidden.base (206.214.251.17) 71.427 ms 74.206 ms             |
| 11  | have.won.their.first.victory (206.214.251.22) 71.665 ms 70.434 ms 7          |
| 12  | against.the.evil.Galactic.Empire (206.214.251.25) 69.218 ms 70.621           |
| 13  | During.the.battle (206.214.251.30) 69.059 ms 68.931 ms 69.981 ms             |
| 14  | Rebel.spies.managed (206.214.251.33) 77.247 ms 72.757 ms 77.61               |
| 15  | to.steal.secret.plans (206.214.251.38) 71.224 ms 71.164 ms 69.543            |
| 16  | to.the.Empires.ultimate.weapon (206.214.251.41) 68.744 ms 68.824             |
| 17  | the.DEATH.STAR (206.214.251.46) 72.316 ms 74.551 ms 66.354 ms                |
| 18  | an, armored, space, station (206, 214, 251, 49) 69, 413 ms 70, 334 ms 6      |
| 19  | with.enough.power.to (206.214.251.54) 66.182 ms 66.627 ms 71.23              |
| 20  | destroy.an.entire.planet (206.214.251.57) 71.926 ms 71.266 ms 70.            |
| 21  | Pursued.by.the.Empires (206.214.251.62) 67.298 ms 65.956 ms 66.              |
| 22  | sinister.agents (206.214.251.65) 65.020 ms 67.806 ms 70.508 ms               |
| 23  | Princess.Leia.races.home (206.214.251.70) 68.894 ms 71.147 ms 71             |
| 24  | aboard.her.starship (206.214.251.73) 72.130 ms 71.093 ms 74.026              |
| 25  | custodian.of.the.stolen.plans (206.214.251.78) 68.568 ms 67.939 ms           |
| 26  | that.can.save.her (206.214.251.81) 67.063 ms 69.874 ms 68.889 m              |
| 27  | people.and.restore (206.214.251.86) 70.395 ms 70.144 ms                      |
| 28  | freedom.to.the.galaxy (206.214.251.89) 66.098 ms 65.432 ms                   |
| 29  | 00 (206.214.251.94) 75.931 ms 74.159 ms 80.012                               |
| 30  | 00 (206.214.251.97) 73.026 ms 73.403 ms 73.256                               |
| 31  | 00 (206.214.251.102) 83.602 ms 82.079 ms 70.743                              |
| 32  | 00 (206.214.251.105) 70.459 ms 69.403 ms 68.782 m                            |
| 33  | 00 (206.214.251.110) 68.516 ms 72.472 ms 71.811 ms                           |
| 34  | 00 (206.214.251.113) 69.056 ms 65.981 ms 68.202 ms                           |
| 35  | 00 (206.214.251.118) 66.790 ms 71.556 ms 74.292 ms                           |
| 36  | 00 (206.214.251.121) 68.286 ms 71.042 ms 71.587 ms                           |
| 37  | 00 (206.214.251.126) 72.702 ms 71.785 ms 72.442 ms                           |
| 38  | 00 (206.214.251.129) 78.143 ms 74.411 ms 72.828 ms                           |
| 39  | 00 (206.214.251.134) 69.692 ms 66.187 ms 67.369 ms                           |
| 10  | 00 (206.214.251.137) 69.184 ms 70.678 ms 67.445 ms                           |
| 11  | 00 (206.214.251.142) 70.383 ms 68.220 ms 67.543 ms                           |
| 12  | 00 (206.214.251.145) 67.593 ms 72.970 ms 73.220 ms                           |
| 13  | 00 (206.214.251.150) 70.964 ms 69.082 ms 70.831 ms                           |
| 14  | 00 (206.214.251.153) /3.856 ms /1.848 ms /0.311 ms                           |
| 15  | 00 (206.214.251.158) 71.517 ms 69.204 ms 69.538 ms                           |
| 0   | 00 (206.214.251.161) 68.076 ms 68.179 ms 67.620 ms                           |
| 47  | 0-0 (206,214,251,166) 68.738 ms 70.518 ms 68.757 ms                          |
| 10  | UU (200.214.251.103) 08.261 H5 /U.225 H5 /4.611 H5                           |
| 2   | L (200.214.231.174) /0.203 ms /1.008 ms /1.072 ms                            |
|     | been (CIEs Get Rored (206 214 251 182) 75 215 ms 72 257 ms 71 222 ms         |
| 52  | read more at headlenetworks net (206 214 251 195) 70 254 ms 72 700 ms        |
| 1.6 | readinion charine agreene (morks incl. (200,214,201,100) 70,204 ms 73,702 ms |

Slide 72