# Worksheet Class 6: DNS

# Q1. Why do we need to map names to IP addresses? Why not route on names at the network layer?

- A. Domain names are hierarchical, so we can route on domain names too.
- B. Domain names are variable length, vs IP are fixed length, some changes will be required to switch.
- C. With domain names we wouldn't know where to route to geographically.
- D. Some other reason.

#### Q2. What's the biggest challenge for DNS?

- A. It's old.
- B. The fact that the Internet is global.
- C. The fact that DNS is now critical infrastructure.
- D. The sheer number of name lookups happening at any given time.
- E. How and when the name -> IP address mapping should change.


#### Q3. Who should control DNS?

- A. US government
- B. UN / International government
- C. A Private corporation
- D. Someone else

## Q4. Why do we structure DNS hierarchically? Which of these helps the most? Drawbacks?

- A. It divides up responsibility among parties.
- B. It improves performance of the system.
- C. It reduces the size of the state that a server needs to store.
- D. Some other reason.

Q5. Which of the two DNS query models would you use to resolve a hostname to an IP address? Why?



- Q1. Caching DNS Responses: The TTL (Time-to-live) values for Resource Records in the DNS should be..(provide your reasons)
  - A. Short, to make sure that changes are accurately reflected
  - B. Long, to avoid re-queries of higher-level DNS servers
  - C. Some combination depending on certain parameters (explain which)
  - D. Some other reason.

- Q2. Answer the following questions in context of the DNS response (a.k.a, Resource Record RR) below:
  - A. How many answers were returned? What does it mean if the answer section is empty?
  - B. What is the time-to-live in this RR in seconds?
  - C. How many additional records are present?

```
$ dig @a.root-servers.net www.freebsd.org +norecurse
:: Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57494
;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 2
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.freebsd.org. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                 NS
                     b0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.
      172800
             IN
                     d0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.
     172800
             ΙN
                 NS
:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:
b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 172800 IN A 199.19.54.1
d0.org.afilias-nst.org.
                        172800 IN A 199.19.57.1
```

Q3. Answer the following questions in context of the DNS response (a.k.a, Resource Record RR) below:, The dig query is asking a (.org server at 199.19.54.1) for the IP address of www.freebsd.org. How many answers were returned?

```
A. What do the authoritative records and additional records tell us?

$ dig @199.19.54.1 www.freebsd.org +norecurse
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39912
;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.freebsd.org. IN A

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
freebsd.org. 86400 IN NS ns1.isc-sns.net.
freebsd.org. 86400 IN NS ns2.isc-sns.com.
freebsd.org. 86400 IN NS ns3.isc-sns.info.
```

- Q4. Answer the following questions in context of the DNS response (a.k.a, Resource Record RR) below:
  - A. Assuming this is the next DNS query we do, following the query in Q3; list the server being contacted here, and whether this is an authoritative name server, top-level domain or the root server.

```
$ dig @ns1.isc-sns.net www.freebsd.org +norecurse
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 17037
;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.freebsd.org. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.freebsd.org. 3600 IN A 69.147.83.33
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
freebsd.org.
             3600 IN NS ns2.isc-sns.com.
freebsd.org. 3600 IN
                       NS ns1.isc-sns.net.
freebsd.org. 3600 IN NS ns3.isc-sns.info.
:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.isc-sns.net. 3600
                       IN A 72.52.71.1
ns2.isc-sns.com. 3600 IN A 38.103.2.1
ns3.isc-sns.info. 3600 IN A 63.243.194.1
```

# Attacking DNS

## Security risk #1: malicious DNS server

- So far from what we have seen it seems as though if any of the DNS servers
  queried are malicious, they can lie to us and fool us about the answer to our DNS
  query.
- What are the potential consequences?
- Consider the following legitimate DNS response for eecs.mit.edu followed by a
  poisoned response. What are the consequences to <a href="www.swarthmore.edu">www.swarthmore.edu</a> with
  the poisoned DNS response?

## **Legitimate Response:**

- ; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a
- ;; global options: +cmd
- ;; Got answer:
- ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901
- ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3,

ADDITIONAL: 3

## ;; QUESTION SECTION:

;eecs.mit.edu. IN A

#### ;; ANSWER SECTION:

eecs.mit.edu. 21600 IN A 18.62.1.6

## :: AUTHORITY SECTION:

mit.edu. 11088 IN NS BITSY.mit.edu. mit.edu. 11088 IN NS W20NS.mit.edu. mit.edu. 11088 IN NS STRAWB.mit.edu.

## ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:

STRAWB.mit.edu. 126738 IN A 18.6.6.6

BITSY.mit.edu. 166408 IN A 18.72.0.3 W20NS.mit.edu. 126738 IN A 18.70.0.160

## **Poisoned DNS Response**

```
; ; <<>> DiG 9.6.0-APPLE-P2 <<>> eecs.mit.edu a
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19901
;; flags: gr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 3,
ADDITIONAL: 3
:: QUESTION SECTION:
;eecs.mit.edu.
                             ΙN
                                Α
;; ANSWER SECTION:
eecs.mit.edu.
                      21600 IN A
                                       18.62.1.6
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
mit.edu.
                                       BITSY.mit.edu.
                      11088
                              IN NS
mit.edu.
                      11088
                              IN NS
                                       W20NS.mit.edu.
mit.edu.
                      30000
                              IN NS
                                      www.swarthmore.edu
:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:
www.swarthmore.edu.
                      30000
                              IN A
                                      18.6.6.6
BITSY.mit.edu.
                                           18.72.0.3
                      166408 IN
                                       Α
W20NS.mit.edu.
                                          18.70.0.160
                      126738
                             ΙN
```